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This paper addresses reasons for innovation. Innovation requires resources to transform 
new ideas into products/services to be sold in the market and diffused in society. Yet in 
the earlier stage of innovation process uncertainty always prevails both technologically 
and economically. There is no objective consensus that the new idea will succeed in the 
end. It is thus necessary for those people who want to realize the innovation to show 
others both inside and outside the firm legitimate reasons for mobilizing their precious 
resources, including people, materials, facilities, and money, throughout the process 
toward commercialization. How do firms legitimize the resource mobilization for 
innovation? Drawing on 18 case studies on Okochi Memorial Prize winners, which our 
joint research project has carried out over last five years, and building upon the existing 
literature on internal corporate venturing, new ventures, and other related issues, this 
paper examines the innovation process of established Japanese firms from idea 
generation to commercialization with a primary focus on the process by which resource 
mobilization was legitimized. 1. Introduction 
  How have Japanese firms achieved innovation? What processes have they gone 
through from idea generation to commercialization? Viewing the process of innovation 
as that of legitimizing resource mobilization for transforming a new, uncertain idea into 
economic value, this study explores “reasons for innovation” that could mobilize 
necessary resources.   
  Innovation requires resources to transform new ideas into products/services to be 
sold in the market and diffused in society. Yet in the earlier stage of innovation process 
uncertainty always prevails both technologically and economically. There is no 
objective consensus that the new idea will succeed in the end. It is thus necessary for 
those people who want to realize the innovation to show others both inside and outside 
the firm legitimate reasons for mobilizing their precious resources, including people, 
materials, facilities, and money, throughout the process toward commercialization. 
  Cases of the Okochi Memorial Prizes winners serve as our empirical materials. 
Drawing on 18 case studies and building upon the existing literature on internal 
corporate venturing, new ventures, and other related issues, this paper examines the 
innovation process of established Japanese firms from idea generation to 
commercialization with a primary focus on the process by which resource mobilization 
was legitimized. Since this study is still in progress, this paper offers the results of a 
tentative analysis and discusses preliminary implications. 
 
2. Research Question: Reasons for Resource Mobilization Towards Innovation
1
  Innovation is a process of introducing something new that could provide 
economic value (Hitotsubashi University Institute of Innovation Research 2001). 
Innovation involves something new, but mere newness is not enough for economic 
value. Invention, discovery, patents or technological development are not innovation. 
Any one of these could be an important component of innovation, but it does not lead to 
economic value by itself. Innovation is achieved only when an innovative idea is 
transformed into a commercial goods to be bought in the market and spread throughout 
society.  
                                                 
1 For a more comprehensive discussion of earlier studies on which the central issues, analytical 
perspective and framework of this study draw, see Karube, Takeishi, and Aoshima (2007). 
2   There are two conditions for realizing innovation. One is the effective creation of 
a new idea on technology, product, or business. The essence thereof lies in the creation 
of knowledge. The other is resource mobilization for a process of transforming a new, 
promising idea into a business. Economic value cannot be achieved solely by an 
individual or a technology development division. Collaboration from diverse functions 
and actors and investment of various resources are necessary for market acceptance and 
social diffusion. 
  Between these two major aspects of innovation process, knowledge creation and 
resource mobilization, we focus on the latter. Our particular interest is in the reality that 
resources of diverse actors need to be mobilized for realizing innovation from a new 
idea while the very innovativeness of the idea hinders the mobilization of resources 
from relevant actors. 
  Innovation starts from an idea whose technological feasibility and marketability is 
uncertain. There is no certain, objective prospect of achieving economic value 
beforehand. In addition, innovation sometimes causes opposition from the established 
forces because it may hurt their vested interests. Since innovative ideas are susceptible 
to hesitation and opposition due to their uncertainty and potential to damage vested 
interests, it is difficult to mobilize resources of relevant actors. Of course there are some 
cases that started with high expectations shared by many people and ended up with 
successful results as expected. The history of innovation, however, suggests that 
numerous cases of innovation with ex-post success indeed started as ideas and 
technologies with low ex-ante expectations. If a firm aims at achieving a major success, 
it has to be ahead of its competitors in resource mobilization for the development and 
commercialization of an idea that seems unpromising to other firms (Figure 1). 
  In other words, the process of realizing innovation can be described as a process 
of attracting attention to a new idea susceptible to resistance, gaining organizational and 
social acceptance of the idea, managing cooperation from relevant actors, and 
transforming the existing institutions (Van de Ven 1986). As Shumpeter (1942) points 
out, innovation entails “detaching productive means already employed somewhere from 
the existing cyclical economic activities and allotting them to new activities,” and thus 
realigning the flow of resource mobilization in society.   
  Then, we have to answer the following question to understand the process of 
innovation: “Why did relevant actors decide to invest scarce resources in the 
3 development and commercialization of an innovative idea and technology even though 
its technological feasibility and marketability were uncertain?” In short, we have to 
clarify the “reasons” that enable resource mobilization in the process of innovation. 
  This question is particularly important for today’s Japanese firms. They have 
competed on quality and cost with their outstanding capabilities of product development 
and manufacturing in their effort to catch up with Western rivals. Now that Japanese 
firms have become global leaders in technological development, they need to create 
new products, services, and businesses by themselves. The majority of earlier studies on 
innovation by Japanese firms have dealt with one of the two major aspects of innovation, 
knowledge creation. They primarily focused on organizational management for new 
product development, learning, and knowledge creation.   
  These studies, however, have shed little light on important problems of the other 
aspect, resource mobilization. Such problems include: 1) How Japanese firms have 
worked on the development of new technologies or prototypes when uncertainty 
prevails (rather than on the product development when uncertainty is low), or how they 
worked on creating a new business (within which product development is managed); 2) 
How they have invested resources in learning and knowledge creation; and 3) how they 
have put resources for transforming created knowledge into economic value (investment 
for mass production, distribution, and business system). 
 
3. Analytical Viewpoint and Framework 
Previous Research 
  In exploring the above questions, we stand on the view that innovation is a 
process of obtaining legitimacy of mobilizing resources of relevant social actors for 
transforming a new idea into economic value. 
  In order to realize innovation from a new idea that doesn’t offer objective prospect 
of success, one has to convince relevant actors inside and outside the organization of the 
legitimacy of putting manpower, allocating budget, and investing other precious 
resources for development and commercialization. One needs a “good reason” for 
mobilizing necessary resources. We can advance the process of innovation as far as 
those actors acknowledge the legitimacy. Once this legitimacy is lost, the process halts. 
  This viewpoint is founded mainly on two streams of studies, those on internal 
corporate venturing and technological innovation at large, established firms, and those 
4 on innovation by new ventures. 
  Many studies of the former stream analyzed the organizational process of resource 
allocation (Burgelman 1983, Dougherty and Hardy 1996, Quinn 1986), and explored the 
roles and characteristics of “champions,” persons who actively promoted and led such a 
process (Day 1994, Howell and Higgins 1990, Maidique 1980, Markham 2000, Schon 
1963, Roberts 1980). Some studies treated product development at large firms as the 
process of legitimization (Dougherty and Heller 1994). Research on disruptive 
technology also dealt with the issue of resource allocation for innovative technology 
within established firms (Christensen and Bower 1996). All these studies pointed out the 
difficulty of mobilizing resources for new ideas at large firms. In this sense, these 
studies share common interests in legitimacy for innovation with us. However, 
legitimacy itself and ways to obtain it, which are our focus of attention, have not been 
fully explored. There is room for further research on organizational processes since 
previous studies have primarily focused on vertical interactions for establishing 
legitimacy across different hierarchical levels inside the organization. They have shown 
little interest in horizontal interactions across different divisions and multiple actors 
inside and outside the organization. 
  The latter stream of studies used the concept of legitimization in analyzing the 
process of securing resources by new ventures (Aldrich and Fiol 1994, Delmar and 
Shane 1994, McMullen and Shepherd 2006, Starr and MacMillan 1990, Yamada 2006, 
Zimmerrman and Zeits 2002). However, only a small number of researchers have thus 
far made empirical analysis on reasons for resource mobilization. Also, this stream 
centered on how venture companies prove the legitimacy of their innovation to 
outsiders and pays little attention to resource mobilization within their organizations 
because top executives are almost always champions of innovation. 
  Building upon the viewpoints and results of these earlier research works, our 
study would make an empirical analysis of the process of innovation at major Japanese 
firms. We empirically explore types and means of legitimization through vertical and 
horizontal interactions across relevant actors inside and outside the firms, and would 
like to provide some new insights on the process of innovation. 
 
Analytical Framework 
  This study analyzes 1) what kind of legitimacy the firms in question obtained; 2) 
5 how they obtained such legitimacy; and 3) to whom they proved such legitimacy, along 
with the process of innovation. 
  Suchman (1995), who has theoretically addressed the concept of organizational 
legitimacy, defines legitimacy as “a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.” There are three primary 
types of legitimacy: pragmatic legitimacy based on direct interest or preference of the 
people to whom it is to be appealed; moral legitimacy based on normative approval; and 
cognitive legitimacy based on tacit acceptance (Suchman 1995). The most important 
factors for resource mobilization toward innovation are expectations of earnings accrued 
from technological innovation and prospect of reasonable returns from investment. The 
more certain they are, the easier resource mobilization becomes. These factors form part 
of what Suchman calls pragmatic legitimacy. We call this type of legitimacy direct 
economic rationality. Capitalist society is a system in which social resources are 
mobilized based on direct economic rationality. 
  As pointed out above, however, it is difficult to have a clear, objective prospect of 
economic value to be accrued from an innovative idea before its implementation. Firms 
(should) decide to invest in the commercialization of innovative ideas based on direct 
economic rationality in the end. Yet, during the process prior to such final decisions, 
firms often need to ensure other types of legitimacy to secure necessary resources. 
  Although different strategies can be adopted to gain different types of legitimacy, 
there are three strategies: conforming to the relevant actors; selecting the most 
appropriate actors; and manipulating the relevant actors (Suchman 1995). As the 
process of innovation advances toward commercialization, the people to whom one has 
to appeal for legitimacy also change ᴷᴷ from colleagues within the R&D division, 
and people in the production and sales functions to members of divisional and corporate 
levels. Such interactions with relevant actors to obtain legitimacy both vertically and 
horizontally within the firm are further extended to outside actors such as suppliers of 
components, complementary products, and services, and various institutions. Through 
the innovation process, one has to use various strategies for various actors to obtain 
different types of legitimacy. 
  This study observes the entire process of innovation from the initial stage of 
conceiving an innovative idea, and the development of technologies and prototypes to 
6 product development and commercialization, and analyzes what strategies were used to 
obtain different types of legitimacy towards achieving economic value in the end. 
 
4. Sample Cases: Winners of the Okochi Memorial Prize 
  Our empirical data are drawn from multiple cases of innovation. Samples were 
obtained from winners of the Okochi Memorial Prizes. The prize was founded in 1954 
to commemorate the academic and industrial achievements of Dr. Masatoshi Okochi, 
the 3rd Director of the Institute of Physical and Chemical Research (generally know as 
RIKEN) and the founder of the RIKEN industrial group. Since then, the Okochi 
Memorial Foundation has awarded prizes to people and firms achieving outstanding 
technological innovation every year. A total of nearly 700 projects have won the prizes 
thus far. The recipients are selected based on their achievements in production and 
effects on industries. In this sense, they are desirable materials for an empirical study of 
innovation, not as mere invention or technological development but as the introduction 
of a new idea that realized economic value. 
  Individual cases have been studied jointly by faculty members and students of the 
Institute of Innovation Research and the Graduate School of Commerce and 
Management, Hitotsubashi University. Starting in the autumn of 2003, this research 
project has picked up a total of 25 cases. Some of them have been already completed 
while others are still underway. It is difficult to make a quantitative analysis of these 
cases to prove some hypotheses because the number of sample cases is limited, and the 
industry sectors and technologies covered vary greatly. This study rather intends to 
explore the characteristics of the process of realizing innovation through the analysis 
based on the above viewpoints and framework.
2
 
5. Case Analysis (Provisional) 
  Since some case studies are still in progress, it is premature to make a full-scale 
analysis across all the cases at this moment. For now this paper presents some findings 
from a provisional comparative analysis across 18 cases, for which basic data are 
                                                 
2 This research project has been financially supported by the Hitotsubashi University 21st 
Century COE Program “Dynamics of Knowledge, Corporate System and Innovation.” The 
outline of the project and the case studies completed are available at: 
http://www.iir.hit-u.ac.jp/researchCOEokochiprize(A).html.  
7 available. A summary of our analysis is shown in Table 1. 
 
Process towards Commercialization 
  How long did it take for the 18 cases from the start to commercialization of 
innovations (See Table 1-(1))? The average time taken from the start (starting idea 
conception or technology development) to commercialization was 8.8 years. 
Innovations were achieved within five years from the start in five cases, while it took 
more than 15 years in three cases.   
  Time from the start to commercialization could be divided into two periods. One 
is the period before starting product development, and the other is that after starting 
product development. The average time taken for the former was 5.3 years and the latter 
3.5 years. The period before starting product development was longer than the period 
after it in most cases. Only four cases were exceptions. Firms usually start product 
development when the product’s basic specifications and the market to be targeted are 
somewhat clearly defined. The general pattern is that innovation process proceeds 
relatively slowly until reaching the stage of product development and accelerates 
thereafter. 
 
Obstacles to Resource Mobilization 
  How did the sample cases move forward through the process from the start to 
commercialization? Did they face any opposition or resistance against resource 
mobilization? If they did, what types of opposition or resistance did they face (See Table 
1 (2))?   
  Six out of the 18 cases secured support from business divisions at the start, based 
on some shared expectation of business success. They include three projects launched 
on the request of specific business divisions (cases #2, #5 and #18 in the table) and one 
project initiated to meet the demand of a major potential customer (#17). Yet in the 
remaining 12 cases (two thirds of the whole), idea conception or technology 
development were started by some engineers or groups within research and 
development function when there was no clear prospect of specific economic value and 
business success. It is true in most cases that when those engineers started projects they 
envisioned some, if not clear, images of how their ideas/technologies would be used in 
the future. At that time, however, the technological feasibility and marketability of the 
8 ideas were uncertain. In other words, the project entered the engineering work process 
for innovation without any firm prospect promising enough to attract support from 
specific business divisions. 
  The resources necessary at the early stage of innovation are researchers and 
engineers, and R&D facilities, equipment, and materials. The amount of investment for 
such resources is relatively small, although uncertainty is high. This fact often helps 
innovation advance at this stage. Yet the mobilization of resources for activities with no 
clear outlook for future results has to be approved at least within the R&D division. 
Inspired by their personal interests, engineers sometimes start working for innovation as 
sideline projects. Even such projects need to obtain official approval within the R&D 
division, acquire budgets, and secure additional manpower in order to get moving. As 
mentioned above, the cases examined in this study on average spent more than five 
years on the process before starting product development. It took more than ten years 
before starting product development in three cases. At the very least, support within the 
R&D division has to be maintained in all these years. 
  Once key technologies are successfully developed and technological feasibility is 
in sight, the innovation process moves to the stage of product development, and then 
advances to commercialization. Only four cases out of the 18 cases faced no strong 
opposition or resistance during this period. Three of them managed to enlist support 
from a top executive or a specific business division from early on (#12, #15 and #18) 
while the other found a business unit desiring to undertake commercialization, soon 
after the establishment of technological feasibility (#4). The other 14 cases, however, 
faced some opposition or resistance. Four of them got a good start with support from 
specific business divisions, and then met obstructions on their way to commercialization 
because the voice of skeptics within the firms became louder due to changing 
circumstances, unexpectedly disappointing results, or time spent longer than expected 
(#1, #2, #8 and #17). 
  During the processes before commercialization, all one has to do is to invest 
limited amount of resources in R&D activities. As innovation gets closer to the stage of 
commercialization, many different actors should be involved. Manufacturing plants 
have to be tooled up. Sales/service systems have to be built. Cooperation from suppliers 
of components, materials, and complementary products and services has to be secured. 
The volume of resources invested at this stage is huge. Furthermore, the vested interests 
9 of some business divisions might be hurt. Eleven cases encountered 
opposition/resistance from line of business, production, sales or accounting due to the 
lack of clear prospect of success and high risks. Two cases faced resistance based on 
possible adverse effects on existing businesses. It is not easy to overcome such 
opposition because it is much easier for us to be skeptical of something new than to be 
convinced of its success. There should be a good reason that is convincing enough to 
have some people agree to commit their resources. 
 
Legitimization of Resource Mobilization 
  Out of the 18 cases, only two enjoyed smooth sailing throughout the whole 
process, starting with support from specific business divisions and reaching 
commercialization without facing no objection (#15 and #18). The other 16 cases were 
barred from mobilizing resources more or less on their ways to commercialization 
because they were not able to show direct economic rationality (a clear prospect of 
return on investment) successfully. 
  However, such obstacles were somehow overcome and commercialization was 
achieved in the end in these cases winning the Okochi Memorial Prizes. How did they 
legitimize resource mobilization (See Table 1 (3))? 
  In many cases, an important driver was technology-oriented mentality, with which 
engineers were keen to develop new technologies even if there was no prospect of 
business success. This is true for the aforementioned 12 cases that started without any 
certain support from business divisions. What underlay this mentality were 
organizational culture and traditional values to emphasize technological leadership and 
challenges. Examples include a strong drive for developing a can manufacturing 
technology without using lubricant (#3), developing a technology to diagnose pancreatic 
cancer (the most difficult of all cancers to detect) as a flagship technology in the 
medical equipment business (#5), or eliminating liquid-containing batteries from quartz 
watches (#7). 
  It should be noted that, even if the organization has such mentality, there are still 
many possible directions and choices to pursue technological development. In some 
cases, non-technical reasons affected the course of technological development. The 
existence of an overseas researcher or a competitor trying to develop similar technology 
was the main reason in a number of cases (#1, #9 and #12 and others). An intention of 
10 revitalizing the research organization, not firm expectations of research results, was the 
determining factor for the budget allotment in one case (#8). Motivation to differentiate 
oneself from other groups within the same firm or corporate group was the reason for 
focusing on specific themes from among several options in two cases (#7 and #8).   
  What can be legitimized by technology-oriented mentality is basically limited to 
resource mobilization within the R&D division. One cannot move toward 
commercialization solely by such mentality. If a development project starts from a 
researcher's technological interest and an outstanding technology promising to produce 
substantial business results is developed, resource mobilization for commercialization 
would be easily legitimized without much obstacles. Yet things do not work out well 
like that with many cases. 
  One pattern of breaking walls obstructing commercialization is that a top 
executive exercises his or her leadership. When opposition is met, the top executive 
decides to mobilize resources for commercialization. Among the 18 cases, four fall 
under this pattern. The top executives who led these cases were those leaders 
well-known in the Japanese business history: President Maruta of Kao Corporation (#6), 
Vice President (later President) Nakamura of Seiko Epson Corporation (#7), President 
Shoda of Nissin Pharma Inc. (#12), and Chairman Doko of Toshiba Corporation (#17). 
Stories of strong leadership are fascinating. Yet such cases are few in our sample (four 
out of eighteen). In other cases, the role of top executives was limited to that of the final 
approver of investments that had already been legitimized by someone with the 
organizations. 
  Eight cases fall under the pattern that supporters outside the organization 
contributed to the legitimization of resource mobilization. Examples include: the doctor 
who discovered a new usage of an ultrasonic endoscope, which had not been able to 
show very satisfactory performance for the originally-planned usage (#5); Philips who 
highly evaluated a computed radiography system at an overseas exhibition when the top 
executives within the organization were not very certain of its value (#5), NEC who 
placed the first order for GaAs power module for cellular phones when Matsushita 
Communication Industrial Co., Ltd., a company within the same corporate group, didn’t 
adopt it (#8).   
  Some cases found supporters within the same firm or corporate group. However 
these supporters were often from divisions or organizations that didn’t have regular 
11 contact with the project executing entities. They include subsidiaries (#4 and #9) and 
local or overseas sales subsidiary companies (#1 and #7). Support from such outside or 
peripheral actors, gained intentionally or accidentally, is effective to end a deadlock and 
secure legitimacy to mobilize necessary resources. 
  Another pattern is of that the innovators or its supporters are under heavy pressure 
or in a critical condition. Seven cases fall under this pattern. The factors causing such 
pressure on the former include the dissolution of the organization to develop X-ray 
films (#13), the impending need for the short-term renewal of the blast furnace in the 
Chiba Works (#10), and the possibility of shutdown of the Koriyama office (#2). Those 
causing pressure on the latter include the decreasing sales of Toshiba Battery Co., Ltd. 
(#4) and Tohoku Pioneer Corporation (#9). 
  Decisions on whether resources should be invested in technological innovation 
with uncertainty are affected by the risk preference of the actors involved. Compared to 
high performing organizations, those under pressure or in a crisis tend to be more 




  Having traced the process toward commercialization, we now examine what 
happened in the 18 cases after the commercialization. As shown in Table 1 (1), for some 
cases more than twenty years had passed as of 2006 since the commercialization while 
for others just a few years. In this context, a simple comparison of all the 18 cases is 
rather problematic. With this limitation in our mind, we observe that the cases reached 
the peak of sales 10.5 years after the commercialization on average
3.  
  Putting together this data and the previous data, we have found that one 
innovation on average took eight years from idea conception to commercialization and 
then took following 10 years to reach the peak of sales. No case enjoyed sales growth 
for more than 15 years
4 except for the one that had continued to expand sales for 23 
                                                 
3 This figure is smaller than the real average because some cases have not yet reached the peak 
of sales 
4 It should be noted, however, two cases (#2 and #5) have continued to increase sales for 13 and 
14 years respectively as of 2006 since commercialization. 
 
12 years as of 2006 since commercialization (#13). One case withdrew from the market, 
selling off the business (#4). 
  Various factors would cause sales slump and business discontinuity. It is 
impossible for this study to make a systematic, comprehensive analysis of changes after 
commercialization and the factors involved. However, we might be able to 
hypothetically argue that the legitimization process toward commercialization would 
affect behaviors thereafter in some cases. 
  Although adequate data for analysis is not available at this moment, there is some 
circumstantial evidence that the logic used for the process of legitimization before 
commercialization could hinder further growth and policy changes afterward. For 
example, one case achieved commercialization by support from an outside influential 
actor (NTT) but eventually began losing market share to overseas competitors, who 
came up with new technology, which had been rejected by NTT (#8). In another case, 
commercialization was achieved with support from an overseas sales subsidiary in spite 
of opposition from the headquarter marketing division, but sales leveled off eventually 
due to rather independent behavior of the product development function, which indeed 
helped the development of the technology, and its poor coordination with the marketing 
function (#7). 
  In any of these cases, the logic or idea underlying the resource mobilization 
process later impeded strategic response to important market changes and new 
technological trends. While legitimacy plays an important role in achieving 
commercialization, it may become a constraint when a shift in strategy is necessary 
(Leonard-Burton 1992). 
 
6. Conclusion (Preliminary Discussions) 
  This study is still in progress. Some case studies have not been completed. We 
also need to deepen our analysis in a more systematic manner. It is therefore too early to 
draw a conclusion and address implications, but we would like to make some 
preliminary discussions. 
  Innovation is a process of achieving economic value based on an idea with 
uncertainty by mobilizing resources from relevant actors. The process of innovation is 
comprised of multifaceted factors involving different actors at different stages. This 
process could be analyzed by using the concept of “legitimacy,” which encompasses not 
13 only technological and economic factors but also social and political factors. This 
viewpoint shows that innovation is a chaotic phenomenon that cannot be explained 
solely by economic rationality and is sometimes affected greatly by chance factors. It 
also reveals that the subjective, local reasons of particular actors to agree to mobilize 
resource do matter more than objective, universal reasons. 
  This study provides practitioners with some insights into how to prove different 
types of legitimacy to different actors using different strategies. The cases we examined 
suggest that a good reason could be found or devised to commercialize a new idea at 
large Japanese firms because they are comprised of various actors having local interests 
under specific circumstances. It is important for those seeking innovations to appeal to 
peripheral and outside actors to obtain legitimacy. 
  Some cases also suggest, although only hypothetically under this study, that 
legitimacy obtained locally for resource mobilization could eventually hinder growth 
and changes after commercialization. Specific reasons are indispensable to get the 
process of innovation moving. If they remain special and unique, however, the 
economic value to be achieved may be limited and local accordingly. This is the 
problem of “bounded rationality” of resource mobilization (satisfied with a local 
optimization of resource mobilization) or that of dysfunction of legitimization. 
  Although this is a study on the innovation process at the micro level with 
individual firms as the unit of analysis, the viewpoint could also serve to examine some 
issues at the macro level. One example is technology-market interactions. The process 
of legitimizing resource mobilization can be considered as a medium to connect a 
specific technology with a specific market. This is somewhat similar to Numagami’s 
(1999) argument, which viewed technological innovation as a process of consensus 
building across science, technology, and market among various social actors. The issue 
of national innovation system can also be discussed from this viewpoint. For example, 
the process to legitimate resource mobilization differs between Japan and the United 
States due to differences in national institutions. While American people are willing to 
seek for support from venture capital firms or angels when they are not able to find 
supporters inside their organizations, Japanese people usually try to find a way out 
within their organizations. 
  The research focusing on resource mobilization complements that focusing on 
knowledge creation. The two aspects interact with each other. The way resources are 
14 mobilized affects the way knowledge is created,
5 and the knowledge created enables the 
mobilization of new resources. In order to better understand innovation, we should 
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16   Figure 1: Innovation’s Ex-Ante Expectation and Ex-Post Result 
 
Unforeseen Victory:
How this could be realized;
How to mobilize resources to 
transfer an idea with low
ex-ante expectation into




























































IH (Induction Heating) Cooking
Heater 1990 17 2 19 -
2 Mitsubishi Electric
Corporation
Poki Poki Motor (High Performance
Motor with New Core Structure and
High Speed/Density Coil Wiring)*
1995 3 2 5 13
3 Toyo Seikan Kaisha, Ltd. TULK (Metal Can Mfg Technolgy
with High-Quality, Low-Cost and
Low-Environment Load)*
1992 3258
4 Toshiba Corporation Nickel-Metal Hydride Batteries*
1991 5 6 11 -
5 Olympus Optical Co.,
Ltd.
Ultrasonic Endoscope*
1988 3 7 10 -
6 Kao Corporation "ATTACK"(Super Concentrated
Laundry Detergent Containing
Alkaline Cellulose)* 1987 4 4 8 -






Miniaturized GaAs Power Modules





Thin-Layer Emitting Organic EL
Display*
1997 3695
10 JFE Steel Corporation /
Kawatetsu Machinery
Co., Ltd. /Sankyu Inc.
Short Term Revamping Technique
of Large Scale Blast Furnance*





2001 12 4 16 4
12 Nisshin Pharma Inc. Coenzyme Q10*
1974 10 8 18 9
13 Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd. Computed Radiography System*
1983 8 4 12 23
14 NEC Corporation Hemispherical-Grained (HSG)
Silicon Storage Electrodes 1997 5389
15 Kyocera Corporation Environmentally-Friendly Printer
with Long-Life Electrophotographic
Process*
1992 - - - 14
16 NEC Corporation GaAsMESFET (Field-Effect
Transistor)
1974 3 1 4 10
17 Toshiba Corporation Microcomputer System and its LSI
Family*
1977 2 4 6 13
18 Hitachi, Ltd. Direct On-Chip Wiring Formation
System for LSIs 1989 4 2 6 15
5.3 3.5 8.8 10.5





























Note: *The case study has been completed and available at 
http://www.iir.hit-u.ac.jp/researchCOEokochiprize(A).html. Some data are provisional 
and subject to change. 
18 Table 1 (2) Case Summary: Obstacles to Resource Mobilization 
 
Cases
No support Support obtained Resistance existed No resistance
1 Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co., Ltd.










Poki Poki Motor (High Performance
Motor with New Core Structure and
High Speed/Density Coil Wiring)*
Request from
Koriyama office
Repeated failures in the
development of a small
motor
3 Toyo Seikan Kaisha, Ltd. TULK (Metal Can Mfg Technolgy




No support obtained for
commercialization
4 Toshiba Corporation Nickel-Metal Hydride Batteries* Started from engineer's
technological interest
Toshiba Battery Co.,
Ltd.'s interest in the
technology
5 Olympus Optical Co.,
Ltd.






development due to the
small size of the market








ROI by marketing and
accounting functions











Miniaturized GaAs Power Modules









Industrial Co., Ltd. who
decided to continue to










Not accepted by the
main business division
due to conflicts with
the PDP business
10 JFE Steel Corporation /
Kawatetsu Machinery
Co., Ltd. /Sankyu Inc.
Short Term Revamping Technique




urgent need for short-






































Not accepted by the
production engineering
division
15 Kyocera Corporation Environmentally-Friendly Printer
with Long-Life Electrophotographic
Process*












Not accepted by a
business unit within the
company
17 Toshiba Corporation Microcomputer System and its LSI
Family*
Inquiry from a major
customer (Ford),
started as a company-
wide project
No formal contract with
Ford, Ford's delayed
decision, opposition
due to high risk








12 6 14 4
ʢ2ʣObstacles to Resource Mobilization
Support at start: business division support for
idea conception/developing new technologies
Resistance against commercialization:
opposition/resistance from business division
before commercialization
Total / Average
Note: *The case study has been completed and available at http://www.iir.hitu.ac.jp 
/researchCOEokochiprize(A).html. Some data are provisional and subject to change. 
























IH (Induction Heating) Cooking
Heater
A major breakthrough achieved by
meeting the need of a local sales




Poki Poki Motor (High Performance
Motor with New Core Structure and
High Speed/Density Coil Wiring)*
Koriyama office on the brink of
shutdown, verification by a charismatic
engineer
11
3 Toyo Seikan Kaisha, Ltd. TULK (Metal Can Mfg Technolgy
with High-Quality, Low-Cost and
Low-Environment Load)*
Reevaluation and commercialization due
to emerging interest in environment
protection
11
4 Toshiba Corporation Nickel-Metal Hydride Batteries*
11 1
5 Olympus Optical Co.,
Ltd.
Ultrasonic Endoscope* Market expansion and streamlining of
production system triggered by the
accidental discovery of a new usage by a
doctor
11 1





7 Seiko Epson Corporation Quartz Watch Having an Automatic
Generating System*
Support from a charismatic engineer and
interest shown by a sales company in




Miniaturized GaAs Power Modules
for Mobile Communication System*






Thin-Layer Emitting Organic EL
Display*
Tohoku Pioneer, which was experiencing
sales decline, decided to adopt the
product 11 1
10 JFE Steel Corporation /
Kawatetsu Machinery
Co., Ltd. /Sankyu Inc.
Short Term Revamping Technique
of Large Scale Blast Furnance*
Thorough examination and conviction at
the special technology evaluation






Joint venture with UMC, expectations
for the foundry business 11 1
12 Nisshin Pharma Inc. Coenzyme Q10*
1111
13 Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd. Computed Radiography System* High evaluation by Philips at an
international confenrence and fair
11 11
14 NEC Corporation Hemispherical-Grained (HSG)
Silicon Storage Electrodes
The engineer's move to the production
engineering division, recognition at
academic conferences
11 1
15 Kyocera Corporation Environmentally-Friendly Printer
with Long-Life Electrophotographic
Process*
16 NEC Corporation GaAsMESFET (Field-Effect
Transistor)
Orders from foreign firms via overseas
sales agent
11 1
17 Toshiba Corporation Microcomputer System and its LSI
Family*
Support from the president ("Do it to the
last.")
111
18 Hitachi, Ltd. Direct On-Chip Wiring Formation
System for LSIs
12 16 4 8 7




Note: *The case study has been completed and available at http://www.iir.hitu.ac.jp 
/researchCOEokochiprize(A).html. Some data are provisional and subject to change. 
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